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WHOSE LINE IS IT ANYWAY?: A RETROSPECTIVE STUDY OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S SPLIT ANALYSIS OF § 2254(D)(1)
SINCE 2000
∗

Daniel J. McGrady

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
1
Penalty Act (AEDPA or “the Act”). As the Supreme Court noted,
AEDPA’s purpose was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and
2
federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.” Thus, the
Act sought “to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas and to give effect
to state convictions to the extent possible under law” in an effort to
3
advance the “principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” In sum,
Congress attempted to curb what it deemed as an abuse by convicted
prisoners of the extensive appeals process in the United States court
4
system at that time. From its inception, scholars have recognized
that the Act has indeed greatly limited the access of convicted state
5
prisoners to the federal habeas system.
∗
J.D., May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, The College of
William & Mary. Thanks to Professor John Cornwell for his guidance and to Sarah
Geers for her comments and assistance.
1
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)).
2
Woodford v. Visciotti, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003).
3
Id. at 206 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000)).
4
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Some scholars, however, have suggested that Congress adopted AEDPA more for political reasons than because of any concern for federalism or the efficiency of the judicial process. See, e.g.,
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal
Habeas Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002) (“AEDPA was drafted, enacted, and
signed in an atmosphere of fear. The legislation, which includes substantial cutbacks
in the federal habeas corpus remedy, was Congress’s response to the tragedy of the
Oklahoma City bombing.”).
5
See, e.g., James O. Nygard, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Affecting the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 333,
338 (1996) (“The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limits the
Court’s power to review petitions for writs of habeas corpus.”); Tung Yin, A Better
Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 206 (1998) (“The
Act limits the scope of federal habeas review, wherein the state has rendered a decision on the merits on the claim, to determining whether that decision ‘was contrary
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Prior to AEDPA, federal habeas corpus courts reviewed “the peti6
tioner’s legal claims de novo in the strictest sense of that term.” With
respect to “questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, the
federal courts treated the petition as a wholly new complaint, which
originated ‘an independent civil suit’ and deserved to be adjudicated
7
‘from scratch.’” AEDPA changed these norms in a number of ways.
Perhaps the most significant alteration was § 2254(d)(1). The statute, in pertinent part, states the following:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter8
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

First, note that the statute, by its terms, applies only to state-prisoner
9
habeas corpus petitions. As the provision suggests, the threshold
question is whether a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” at
10
the state court level. Yet even if this requirement is satisfied, the petitioner may not simply assert any and all issues that he or she has
with the state court decision. To the contrary, for a federal court to
grant the writ of habeas corpus under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner must
demonstrate that the state court decision was inconsistent with feder11
al law.
In the determination of this latter point, AEDPA drastically
changed the preexisting habeas corpus process. The statute provides
two requirements for establishing a reversible federal-law error. First,
a federal court may only review federal-law claims, which the provision limits to “clearly established” precedents of the “Supreme Court
12
of the United States.” Because federal courts formerly had a much
13
broader body of law from which to draw when making decisions,
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”).
6
2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 32.1 (5th ed. 2005).
7
Id.
8
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
9
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, § 32.1.
10
§ 2254(d).
11
§ 2254(d)(1).
12
Id.
13
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, § 32.1
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Congress effectually reduced the potential grounds for habeas review.
Second, the provision requires that a state decision be “contrary to,
or involve[] an unreasonable application of” that clearly established
14
law before a court may grant a habeas petition. Thus, in addition to
limiting the potential grounds for habeas review, Congress also altered the de novo standard of review of federal legal claims that existed prior to AEDPA. By restricting the reviewable “federal law” and
adopting the more stringent “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language, AEDPA radically diminished the scope of federal
review.
After years of difficulty for the circuit courts in interpreting §
15
2254(d)(1), in 2000 the Supreme Court issued a definitive state16
ment in Williams v. Taylor, which continues to be the governing law
today. Essentially, Williams established that the “contrary to” and
“unreasonable application” language in the statute formulated two
different tests within the standard even though they are contained in
17
the same sentence. A decision is “contrary to” federal law when a
18
state court applies the wrong federal law entirely. By contrast, a
state court unreasonably applies federal law when its application of
19
the correct precedent is “objectively unreasonable.” The “contrary
to” test is typically, but not always, uncontroversial, because state
20
courts usually will at least identify the correct federal law to apply.
Thus, the focus of this Comment is the “unreasonable application”
test. Here, the Williams Court established its lasting legacy by insisting that an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law is different

Until 1989 . . . federal courts could adjudicate the prisoner’s “complaint” on the basis of legal principles that were not even in existence
at the time the state ruled. And until AEDPA was passed, federal courts
could adjudicate the complaint on the basis of legal principles that had
never become binding on state courts, i.e., on the basis of federal circuit law developed in the absence of any controlling Supreme Court
law on point.
Id.
14

Id.
See infra note 64.
16
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
17
Id. at 404–05.
18
See id. at 405–06.
19
Id. at 409.
20
An example of how the “contrary to” test operates can be found in Williams itself. Justice O’Connor held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary
to” clearly established federal law because the state court applied Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364 (1993), instead of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Williams, 529 U.S. at 413–14 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
15
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21

from an objectively unreasonable application of that law. Accordingly,
Williams cemented a notion that had existed, albeit tenuously, since
the adoption of AEDPA: even if a federal court believes in its independent judgment that a state-court decision applied federal law incorrectly, it must deny a petition for habeas corpus so long as the de22
cision was “objectively reasonable.”
The interpretative gap between incorrect and unreasonable has
been the subject of many Supreme Court decisions since 2000. Because this Comment focuses exclusively on the application of §
2254(d)(1) to capital punishment cases, its analysis is necessarily li23
mited to decisions involving capital sentences. In this context, the
results are staggering. The so-called conservative bloc of the Court,
which at various times has consisted of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, has found a state-court decision to be an
24
“unreasonable application” of federal law in only 4–14% of cases.
By contrast, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens—the so-called liberal bloc of the Court—have found the states’ decisions to be an “un25
reasonable application” of the law 53–64% of the time. A review of
the Court’s cases interpreting § 2254(d)(1) in the capital context also
reveals that the decisions in this area are often split five-to-four, with
the holdings hinging solely on the analyses of Justices Kennedy and
26
O’Connor. The latter two justices have applied a more genuine—
27
yet entirely undefined—standard in reaching their conclusions.
A retrospective analysis of the Court’s decisions since Williams v.
Taylor demonstrates that the two sides of the Court are not merely
disagreeing over the application of the present standard; they are actually applying two completely different standards. The conservative
bloc, to whom I refer throughout this Comment as the “blind deference camp,” has blindly deferred to the state court’s interpretation
28
of federal law. On the other hand, the more liberal justices, to
whom I refer throughout this Comment as the “de novo camp,” have

21

Id. at 412.
See infra Part II.B.
23
Contrary to what its name suggests, the AEDPA is not exclusively limited to
capital cases. For purposes of this Comment—in the interest of clarity and brevity,
and also because I view the results in capital cases to be particularly troublesome—I
have elected to restrict my focus accordingly.
24
See infra Part IV.A.
25
See infra Part IV.A.
26
See infra Part V.A.
27
See infra Part V.A.
28
See infra Part IV.A.
22
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applied de novo review akin to what was in place prior to AEDPA.
This separation between the two blocs is stark and evidences three
critical problems stemming from the provision as it has been applied
since Williams v. Taylor.
First, several cases with similar facts have led to inconsistent results. Often split five-to-four, such decisions demonstrate that the
standard has become arbitrary with results hinging on which camp
30
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor aligned with in a particular case.
The second issue flows from the first: namely, the provision fails to
provide petitioners with the proper notice of what is required to chal31
lenge a state decision. Finally, and most importantly, the inconsistent standard is dangerous because the differences in opinion regarding the provision in capital cases result in life-or-death
32
consequences. Given these considerations and the fact that federal
courts are generally in a better position to evaluate federal law than
the state courts where these claims originate, the Supreme Court
should at the very least define the standard by which “reasonableness”
is to be judged. Yet it seems that the optimal solution to the current
dilemma is a congressional revision of the statue creating a new exception: in capital cases, federal law claims should be reviewed as they
33
were prior to AEDPA—de novo.
Part II of this comment will outline habeas corpus procedure as
it existed prior to AEDPA, as well as the legislative concerns that led
to its adoption. Part III will discuss the Williams v. Taylor standard
and how it changed the existing interpretations of § 2254(d)(1). Part
IV will provide an overview of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision since 2000 and identify the wide and problematic split between liberal and conservative justices over the meaning of
§ 2254(d)(1). Part V will analyze the three main problems with the
Court’s split analysis: namely, that the standard has become arbitrary,
that it fails to provide proper notice, and that it is dangerous in the
context of life-or-death consequences. Part VI will propose potential
solutions and explain why a balancing of the relevant harms weighs in
favor of altering the statute to provide a de novo standard of review.

29

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part V.A.
31
See infra Part V.B.
32
See infra Part V.C.
33
Recognizing the unique concerns involved with capital punishment is not unprecedented. See, e.g., Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2009, at A16 (explaining that fifteen states have now barred the death penalty).
30
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II. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE PRIOR TO AEDPA AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
A. Habeas Prior to AEDPA
The writ of habeas corpus derives from English common law. In
England, the writ established a system enabling convicted prisoners
34
to contest illegal imprisonments. The United States acknowledged
the writ in its Constitution, which states that “the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva35
sion the public safety may require it.” In 1867, Congress extended
the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners via the Habeas Corpus
Act; however, the act disallowed claims alleging violations of state law
and restricted federal habeas to claims stating a federal-law viola36
tion. Thus, grant of the writ in federal court has always required a
petitioner to demonstrate that he was being held in “custody in viola37
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Given this, a federal court will not grant the writ of habeas corpus
38
where there has been an error in the application of state law. Accordingly, the “vast majority of habeas corpus petitions by state pris39
oners allege a violation of the constitution.”
As discussed earlier, prior to AEDPA, the courts were permitted
to find that convicted state prisoners were being held “in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” where a low40
er court applied federal law incorrectly. An example of the Supreme
Court’s application of de novo review to federal law claims prior to
AEDPA is Burger v. Kemp, where the Court affirmed the denial of a
41
writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner claiming ineffective counsel. In
that case, a Georgia jury sentenced petitioner Burger to death for
42
murder. Burger claimed that his counsel was ineffective because (1)
a conflict of interest existed when his counsel’s partners represented
his co-indictees, and (2) his counsel failed to “develop and present

34
MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN M. GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
A NUTSHELL 483 (2d ed. 2006).
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
36
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2241); see also CAMMACK & GARLAND, supra note 34, at 483.
37
CAMMACK & GARLAND, supra note 34, at 483.
38
Id. at 487.
39
Id.
40
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
41
483 U.S. 776 (1987).
42
Id. at 777.
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mitigating evidence” at the sentencing hearings. While the Court
rightly deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, it applied those
facts de novo with respect to the federal legal claims. The Court rea44
soned that the Strickland standard, as it is laid out, requires defe45
rence to counsel’s decisions. Then, the majority directly evaluated
the evidence presented of Burger’s troublesome circumstances and
came to an independent legal judgment that Burger had not shown
that, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions
[of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent
46
assistance.” The Court did not base the holding on the “objective
reasonability” of the state court’s application of federal law regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, the Court simply believed
that the state court did not apply the Strickland standard incorrectly.
As Burger v. Kemp illustrates, federal courts possessed considerable
flexibility in evaluating federal law claims prior to AEDPA.
B. Legislative History
In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, some lawmakers
began to view the flexibility of the habeas corpus law as an enabling
47
device for convicted prisoners to delay their sentences. If courts reviewed every claim de novo, they feared, then the extensive appeals

43

Id. at 788.
The Strickland standard states the following:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
45
This use of deference should not be confused with the level of review federal
courts apply to this standard. In other words, at that time federal courts were required to review de novo this standard of deference to counsel.
46
Burger, 483 U.S. at 795.
47
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 142 CONG. REC. S3454,
3463 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also Stevenson, supra
note 4, at 704.
44
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48

process in the United States would result in endless “retrials.” Seeking to finalize punishments and accord proper respect for state decisions, congressional representatives debated the best mechanism to
accomplish their goals. Congress, through § 2254(d)(1), ultimately
decided to restrict the reviewable federal law and heighten the degree of incorrectness required to overturn a state level decision.
The legislative history of the Act reveals the intentions and con49
cerns of the authors of § 2254(d)(1). Several members of Congress
worried that federal courts would interpret the “unreasonable appli50
cation” language as establishing a “wrong-but-reasonable standard.”
For example, Senator Patrick Moynihan, a critic of the statute,
warned, “We are about to enact a statute which would hold that constitutional protections do not exist unless they have been unreasonably violated, an idea that would have confounded the framers. Thus
we introduce a virus that will surely spread throughout our system of
51
laws.”
Senator Edward Kennedy’s concerns were even more
pointed. He interpreted the statute as requiring federal courts to
52
simply “defer” to state-level decisions. In short, members of Congress predicted that incorrect applications of federal law would be
protected behind the shield of “unreasonableness,” which would
render even some patently wrong decisions unreviewable under habeas procedure. In this way, some congressional representatives were
concerned—and as subsequent cases would show, rightly concerned—that AEDPA “would prevent federal courts from granting
habeas petitions when a state court decision was wrong as a matter of
federal law, but nonetheless reasonable (under some undisclosed
53
construction of that term).” This last point indicates that it was not

48

See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 142 CONG. REC. S3454,
3463 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also Stevenson, supra
note 4, at 704.
49
As an aside, the Bill passed 91–8–1 in the Senate and 293–133–7 in the House
of Representatives. 142 CONG. REC. S3454 (daily ed. April 17, 1996); 142 CONG. REC.
H3618 (daily ed. April 18, 1996).
50
See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text; see also Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 693 (2003).
51
142 CONG. REC. S3438 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan);
see also Ides, supra note 50, at 693 n.29.
52
142 CONG. REC. S3458 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(“[T]he proposal would unwisely require Federal courts to defer to State courts on
issues of Federal constitutional law. A Federal court could not grant a writ habeas
corpus based on Federal constitutional claims, unless the State court’s judgment was
‘an unreasonable application of Federal law.’”).
53
Ides, supra note 50, at 693.
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only the standard of “reasonableness” that troubled critics, but the
potential danger arising from the fact that the standard was “undefined.”
Even the supporters of AEDPA spurned a wrong-but-reasonable
54
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1). For example, Senator Joseph Biden
identified the potential difficulties implicated by a “wrong-butreasonable” approach:
[T]he bill seems to allow an exception to the general rule
[against granting habeas] but one that is likely to be illusory because a claim can be granted only if the State court’s application
of Federal law to the facts [is] not merely wrong but unreasonable. This is an extraordinar[ily] deferential standard to the State
courts, and I believe it is an inappropriate one. It puts the Federal courts in the difficult position of evaluating the reasonableness
of a State court judge rather than simply deciding whether or not
he correctly applied the law, not whether he did it reasonably.
You can have a reasonable mistake. They could reasonably conclude that on a constitutional provision, it should not apply, when
55
in fact the Supreme Court would rule it must apply.

Senator Arlen Specter, a cosponsor of the bill, stated that he was “not
entirely comfortable” with the “unreasonable application” standard
but he ultimately concluded “that the standard in the bill will allow
Federal courts sufficient discretion to ensure that convictions in State
56
court have been obtained in conformity with the Constitution.”
Senator Orin Hatch, also a cosponsor of the bill, rebutted concerns
over the “wrong-but-reasonable” loophole by arguing that the standard “enables the Federal court to overturn State court positions that
clearly contravene Federal law. It further allows the Federal courts to
review State court decisions that improperly apply clearly established
57
Federal law.” Senator Hatch’s use of the term “improperly” instead
of “unreasonably” suggests that even he, as a supporter, was using the
terms interchangeably. This seems curiously close to equating “incorrect” with “unreasonable,” an interpretation that the Williams v.
58
Taylor decision would later expressly reject.
54

Id. at 694.
141 CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); see
also Ides, supra note 50, at 694.
56
142 CONG. REC. S3472 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter);
see also Ides, supra note 50, at 695.
57
141 CONG. REC. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added); see also Ides, supra note 50, at 695.
58
See infra note 79. Other congressional representatives were even more explicit
about equating “incorrect” with “unreasonable.” See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3465 (daily ed. April, 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“I believe the courts will conclude,
55

MCGRADY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2011 9:07 AM

1608

[Vol. 41:1599

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Moreover, even President Clinton acknowledged the danger of
allowing federal courts to defer to state decisions involving federal
law. Upon signing the law, the President released the following
statement: “I have signed this bill because I am confident that the
Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve independent
review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle
59
of an independent judiciary.” Therefore, as Professor Ides has argued, “to the extent that the legislative history is informative, it reveals some concern that the ‘unreasonable application’ standard of
review might be read to preclude federal court review of a state court
60
decision that could be described as wrong-but-reasonable.” Yet if §
2254(d)(1) is unclear regarding “the scope of the review power embodied in the ‘unreasonable application’ principle, the . . . legislative
history seems to establish . . . that such a radically innovative wrongbut-reasonable standard has no legitimate place within the sphere of inter61
pretive possibilities.”
After considering this legislative history, one wonders what these
same members of Congress would have thought if they could have fo62
reseen the holdings in later cases, such as Woodford v. Visciotti and
63
Early v. Packer. Both opinions explicitly endorsed the “wrong-butreasonable” interpretation of the statute. While the holdings undoubtedly conflict with the aforementioned congressional sentiments, Congress has yet to modify the statute to make it absolutely
clear that such interpretations are incorrect. The Court is not oblias they should, that a constitutional error cannot be reasonable and that if a State
court decision is wrong, it must necessarily be unreasonable.”).
59
Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (April 26, 1996) (emphasis added), available
at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/04/1996-04-24-president-statement-onantiterrorism-bill-signing.html.
60
See Ides, infra note 50, at 697.
61
Id. (emphasis added).
62
537 U.S. 19 (2002). The Court reversed a grant of habeas relief in a per curiam decision. Id. at 20. The majority held that even if the state court was wrong, it
is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment,
the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Id. at 27. Note that while this
per curiam decision appears lopsided, it is only because the case involved a denial of
habeas corpus rights. When the independent judgment of the rest of the Court
aligns with the conservative bloc’s blind deference to the state court, lopsided results
will sometimes emerge. This, however, is not proof that the different sects of the
court are applying the same standard.
63
537 U.S. 3 (2002). The Court reversed a grant of habeas relief in a per curiam
decision. Id. at 4. Even if the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit majority that
there was jury coercion here, the Court stated that “it is at least reasonable to conclude that there was not, which means that the state court’s determination to that
effect must stand.” Id. at 11.
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gated to follow the legislative history of an Act of Congress; rather,
the Court is required to apply its interpretation of the statute as written. Thus, if Congress disagrees with decisions interpreting §
2254(d)(1) as allowing a wrong-but-reasonable standard of review, it
has a responsibility to amend the statute to correct such a misapplication. Instead, Congress remains silent.
III. THE WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR INTERPRETATION OF § 2254(D)(1)
Prior to 2000, the circuit courts disagreed over the proper application of the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language
64
65
of § 2254(d)(1). In Williams v. Taylor, a shifting majority of the
Court construed § 2254(d)(1), and the Court’s interpretation of the
statute remains good law today. The majority granted the petition for
habeas corpus and held that the state court’s decision that defendant’s counsel was effective was both “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the
66
Sixth Amendment. In Williams, the Court identified its decision in

64

Hertz & Liebman described the circuit split as follows:
Three circuits—the 5th, 7th, and 11th—treated Congress’ bifurcation
of section 2254(d)(1) as signaling an intention to apply the ‘contrary
to . . . law’ clause to questions of law and the (in their view) extremely
deferential ‘unreasonable application of . . . law’ clause to mixed questions of law and fact. The 1st, 3d, and 8th Circuits viewed the two
clauses of section 2254(d)(1) as calling for a two-step inquiry, in which
the reviewing court first determined whether the Supreme Court had
already developed a legal standard to ‘govern’ claims of the sort raised
in the habeas corpus application; cases coming within such a standard
were subject to the ‘contrary to . . . law’ clause, leaving other cases subject to the ‘unreasonable application . . . of law’ clause. The 4th Circuit
employed an approach similar to that of the 1st, 3d, and 8th Circuits
but diverged from those circuits by applying more restrictive criteria
for gauging the existence of a ‘governing’ precedent and for assessing
whether an application of law was ‘unreasonable.’ Attempting to navigate between these various approaches, the 6th Circuit deemed one
formulation (the 1st Circuit’s) to be the measure of an aggregate of
two other formulations (the 4th and 5th Circuits’). The remaining
four circuits . . . did not adopt a definitive construction of the statute,
allowing individual panels to apply apparently inconsistent standards.
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at § 32.3.
65
529 U.S. 362 (2000). The decision was six-to-three, with Justice O’Connor and
Justice Stevens authoring separate sections that comprised the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 367, 399. With regard to the result, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Souter, and Stevens reversed the denial of the petition. Id. Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, and Thomas comprised the dissent and concluded that the denial of the
petition was proper. Id. at 416 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66
Id. at 413 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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67

Strickland as the “clearly established federal law” and contended that
the state court’s finding with respect to the counsel’s failure to
present adequate mitigating evidence of defendant’s background and
68
abuse as a child was “objectively unreasonable.”
More important than its particular facts, however, is Williams’s
discussion of the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” tests
of § 2254(d)(1). With respect to these issues, Justice O’Connor’s
69
analysis is the governing opinion.
First, Justice O’Connor’s construction provided that a state court decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Supreme Court . . . law” under § 2254(d)(1) if the
“state court’s decision . . . is substantially different from the relevant
70
precedent of the Supreme Court.”
Justice O’Connor then proceeded to identify two ways in which a state court decision can be
“contrary to” or “substantially different from” Supreme Court
71
precedent. First, a “state-court decision will certainly be contrary to
[the Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cas72
es.”
Second, a “state-court decision will also be contrary to this
Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s]
73
precedent.”
Justice O’Connor continued, in accordance with her interpretation, to give separate consideration to the “unreasonable application”
74
test of § 2254(d)(1). She contended that a “state-court decision that
correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case certainly would qualify
as a decision ‘involving an unreasonable application of . . . clearly es75
tablished Federal law.’” In what has become the crux of the debate
over § 2254(d)(1) since Williams, the Court concluded that a “federal
habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should
ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal
67

See supra note 44 for a discussion of the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
68
Williams, 529 U.S. at 413 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
69
Id. at 401–13.
70
Id. at 405.
71
Id. at 405–06.
72
Id. at 405.
73
Id. at 406.
74
Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08.
75
Id.
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76

law was objectively unreasonable.” The difficulties that would eventually arise from this “objective unreasonableness” standard were
compounded by the fact that the Court did not in any way define the
term or provide a test by which to measure “objective reasonable77
ness.” Instead, the majority adopted an interpretation that Congress
78
had repudiated when it held that, “for purposes of today’s opinion,
the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law” and
that “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasona79
ble.”
In his portion of the majority opinion, Justice Stevens provided
the framework by which courts should evaluate petitions governed by
80
§ 2254 (d)(1). Justice Stevens noted that the first issue for a federal
habeas court is to determine the “clearly established” Supreme Court
81
precedent applicable to the relevant petition. The next question is
whether the state court’s proclamation of federal law—and not its
82
application—is contrary to this Supreme Court precedent. Finally,
Justice Stevens stated that the federal courts should determine
whether the state court “unreasonably” applied the relevant Supreme
83
Court precedent. Although Williams finally established a definitive
standard by which to evaluate § 2254(d)(1), the ambiguity within that
standard has created severe flaws in the federal habeas system.

76

Id. at 409.
The Second Circuit noted the dilemma. See Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100,
111 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Some increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . .
[T]he increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state
court decisions ‘so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.’ We do not
believe AEDPA restricted federal habeas corpus to that extent.”).
78
See supra Part II.B.
79
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
80
Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
81
Id. at 379.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77
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IV. THE PROBLEMATIC SPLIT STANDARD EMERGING FROM WILLIAMS
SINCE 2000
A. The Empirical Results
The focus of this Comment is an empirical study and analysis of
84
the Court’s application of § 2254(d)(1) since Williams. Of the twenty-two cases applying the § 2254(d)(1) standard since then, fifteen
petitions were denied—the Court either affirmed a lower court deci85
sion to deny the writ or reversed a lower court’s grant of the writ. At
first glance, this result is not surprising; in fact, the numbers align
with the expectations. The standard of review requires respect for
decisions at the state level while obliging the Court to exercise independent judgment to overturn “unreasonable” results. Given this, a
50–50 split would suggest that the Court has not shown enough deference and has merely applied something akin to de novo review. On
the other hand, a 100% denial of the writ would imply that the Court
was blindly deferring to the state.
TABLE 1.
Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court’s § 2254(d)(1) Decisions Since
Williams
±Majority Opinion
•Concurring Opinion
• Dissenting Opinion

Case

Grant Deny

86

Williams v. Taylor

84

X

Justices Favoring Grant

Justices Favoring Denial

Scalia, Rehnquist •,
Stevens ±, Souter, Ginburg, Breyer, O’Connor •, Thomas
Kennedy

The following study represents the twenty-two cases decided by the Supreme
Court since the Williams decision in 2000 in which the Court has applied the “unreasonable application” test of § 2254(d)(1) in a capital punishment context. Although
the analysis is restricted to capital cases, it includes one non-capital case because its
reasoning has been particularly influential in several of the capital cases. Throughout the Comment, I will refer to the twenty-two cases collectively as “capital” for brevity. In addition, the analysis only focuses on the application of § 2254(d)(1); decisions hinging on other parts of AEDPA are not within the scope of this Comment.
The cutoff date for this analysis was February 10, 2010.
85
See infra Table 1.
86
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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Case

Grant Deny

Ramdass v. Angelone

Penry v. Johnson

87

X

88

Justices Favoring Grant
Stevens •, Souter,
Ginburg, Breyer

Justices Favoring Denial
Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, O’Connor •,
Kennedy ±

Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas •
Breyer, O’Connor ±,
Kennedy

X

Per Curiam
Woodford v. Visciotti

89

X
Per Curiam

Early v. Packer

90

X
Stevens •

Bell v. Cone

91

X

92

X

Wiggins v. Smith

Scalia, Rehnquist ±,
Thomas, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer,
O’Connor, Kennedy
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia •, Thomas
Breyer, O’Connor ±,
Kennedy, Rehnquist
Unanimous; Rehnquist ±

Price v. Vincent

93

X
Per Curiam

Mitchell v. Esparza

94

X
Per Curiam

Middleton v. McNeil

95

Yarborough v. Alvarado

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

X

96

530 U.S. 156 (2000).
532 U.S. 782 (2001).
537 U.S. 19 (2002).
537 U.S. 3 (2002).
535 U.S. 685 (2002).
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
538 U.S. 634 (2003).
540 U.S. 12 (2003).
541 U.S. 433 (2004).
541 U.S. 652 (2004).

X

Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, Rehnquist,
Breyer •
Thomas, O’Connor •,
Kennedy ±
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Case

Grant Deny

97

Stevens, Souter ±,
Ginsburg, Breyer,
O’Connor •

X

Rompilla v. Beard

Justices Favoring Grant

Justices Favoring Denial
Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, Kennedy •
Per Curiam

Bell v. Cone

98

X

Brown v. Payton*

99

X

Souter •, Stevens, Ginsburg

Scalia •, Thomas,
O’Connor, Kennedy ±,
Breyer •
Unanimous; Thomas ±

Carey v. Musladin

Uttecht v. Brown

100

X

X

Stevens •, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer •

Kennedy ±, Roberts,
Scalia, Thomas, Alito

X

Stevens •, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

Thomas ±, Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Alito

X

Stevens ±, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy

Roberts •, Scalia, Thomas,
Alito

X

Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas •,
Breyer, Kennedy ±
Alito

101

Schriro v. Landrigan

102

Abdul-Kabir v. Quarter103
man

Panetti v. Quarterman

104

Per Curiam
Porter v. McCollum

Smith v. Spisak

105

106

Lockyer v. Andrade**

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

X
Unanimous; Breyer ±;
Stevens •

X

107

545 U.S. 374 (2005).
543 U.S. 447 (2005).
544 U.S. 133 (2005).
549 U.S. 70 (2006).
551 U.S. 1 (2007).
550 U.S. 465 (2007).
550 U.S. 233 (2007).
551 U.S. 930 (2007).
130 S. Ct. 447 (2009).
130 S. Ct. 676 (2010).

X

Stevens, Souter •,
Ginsburg, Breyer

O’Connor ±, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
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*Chief Justice Rehnquist abstaining.
**Not a capital case.

A closer look at the data reveals why these initial inclinations are
mistaken. A justice-by-justice breakdown within the two respective
blocs of justices is essential for a more accurate and honest analysis.
On one end of the spectrum, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, Roberts, and Alito have applied a standard of “blind deference.” These
Justices have only found the state court’s application of federal law to
108
be “objectively unreasonable” in 4–14% of cases, which empirically
demonstrates that the “blind deference” bloc has not applied the independent review required by the standard. Although § 2254(d)(1)
undoubtedly requires respect for state decisions, this was not intended to come at the expense of the Supreme Court’s judgment and
109
its expertise in federal law. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer have basically applied “de novo” review or some standard even
110
less deferential. To say that state courts have applied federal law in
an “objectively unreasonable” fashion 54–63% of the time is to disregard the heightened respect for state decisions envisioned by the statute. The numbers indicate that this group of justices is labeling as
“objectively unreasonable” every state decision that it deems “incorrect,” which is in direct defiance of Williams. Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor fall in between the two blocs, sometimes aligning with the
“blind deference” camp and sometimes aligning with the “de novo”
camp.
The statistics demonstrate conclusively that the conservative bloc
of the Court is appropriately dubbed the “blind deference camp.”
Out of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Scalia has applied §
2254(d)(1) in a capital context, he found the state court’s application
111
of federal law “objectively” unreasonable once (4%). Similarly, out
of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Thomas has applied the provision, he, like Justice Scalia, has found the state court’s application
to be “objectively unreasonable” once (4%). In the fifteen cases in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist has applied § 2254(d)(1) in a capital
107

538 U.S. 63 (2003).
See supra Table 1.
109
See supra notes 56, 57, and 59 and accompanying text.
110
Even with de novo review, appellate courts are generally cautious to overturn
lower court decisions. As the data indicates, however, the justices comprising the “de
novo” camp find the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” 54–63% of the time. Thus, it appears that the members of the Court in the
“de novo” camp are not even showing the deference that might normally be attributed to that standard of review.
111
The following statistics are derived from the data presented in Table 1.
108
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context, he has found that the state court’s application of federal law
112
was “objectively unreasonable” only once (6%). In the seven cases
in which Chief Justice Roberts has considered the provision, he has
joined the “blind deference” camp by finding that the state court’s
application of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” once (14%).
Likewise, Justice Alito has found that the state court’s application has
been “objectively unreasonable” one time in the seven cases in which
he has participated, (14%), which indicates that his replacement of
Justice O’Connor will be an addition to the “blind deference”
113
camp.
Thus, justices in the “blind deference” camp have found a
state court’s application of federal law “objectively unreasonable” in
114
only 4–14% of cases since Williams.
One cannot appreciate the above results without comparing
them with those of the “de novo” camp. This camp, at various times,
has been comprised of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
In the twenty-two cases in which Justice Stevens has applied §
2254(d)(1) in a capital context, he has found the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” fourteen times
(63%). Justice Souter has found the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” twelve out of twenty times
(60%). In the twenty-two cases in which Justice Ginsburg has applied
the provision, she has found that the state court’s application of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” thirteen times (59%). Following the same trend, Justice Breyer has found that the state court’s application of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” twelve out of
115
twenty-two times (54%).
112

See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
See supra Table 1.
114
It should be noted that the one case in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito found the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” was clearly an outlier with extraordinary circumstances. In Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009), the state court had found petitioner Porter guilty of
murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, the Court held that the state decision’s application of Strickland was objectively unreasonable; the state had concluded that no prejudice resulted from petitioner’s counsel’s failure to introduce
certain mitigating evidence. Id. at 454. The evidence not presented included Porter’s status as a veteran who was decorated and wounded in two major engagements
during the Korean War, the subsequent trauma he suffered, brain damage that made
him inclined to behave violently, and his abusive childhood. Id. at 449. Thus, Porter
represents an outer fringe to the “blind deference” camp’s blind allegiance to state
decisions—which was previously absent. But this outer fringe, which only occurred
once in the nine years following Williams, was largely driven by the extreme facts of a
traumatized veteran and the Court’s compassion for his service.
115
Because Justice Sotomayor had only decided two cases as of the February 10,
2010 cut off, this Comment has excluded her from its analysis. See supra Table 1.
113
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Justices Kennedy and O’Connor are the only justices whose
116
Out
numbers have aligned with the expectations of the standard.
of the fifteen cases in which Justice O’Connor applied § 2254(d)(1)
in a capital context, she has found the state court’s application of
federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” four times (26%). Similarly, out of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Kennedy has considered the provision, he has found the state court’s decision on federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” six times (27%). Thus, these
two justices find the state court’s application of the law reasonable
most of the time, but on certain occasions, they decide that it is appropriate for the Court to intervene.
This seems to be exactly what the statute, and the standard of
117
Williams, intended.
In effect, their decisions have been the decisions of the Court, because of the unwillingness of the two blocs of
justices to move across the line. Although their effort seems to have
been the most genuine, the standard for “unreasonableness” that
they have applied is undefined and leaves one to speculate as to how
to harmonize seemingly irreconcilable results. Thus, Williams has left
a large analytical gap between the “de novo” and “blind deference”
groups, which have not applied the standard at all; the only middle
ground between the two camps has been occupied by the undefined
and unpredictable analyses of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor. The
resulting uncertainty has led to the current state of the law—an arbitrary standard that fails to provide proper notice to potential petitioners. This standard has been particularly troublesome when con118
sidering that the stakes often involve the petitioner’s life.
The Justices who recently joined the Court will have an interesting impact on the two camps and likely will make the arguments put
forth in this Comment even more poignant. The addition of Chief
Justice Roberts will have virtually no impact because he seems to
merely fill the void left by Justice Rehnquist in the “blind deference”
119
camp. Justice O’Connor’s departure, however, has left a void in the
middle of the Court that has been replaced with Justice Alito’s alle120
giance to the “blind deference” camp. The results of this shift cannot be understated and will be discussed in more detail later in this

116

Presumably, the state courts’ application of federal law will usually, but not always, be “objectively reasonable.”
117
See supra Part II.B.
118
See infra Part V.
119
See supra Table 1.
120
See supra Table 1.
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121

Comment. While the decisions were once swayed almost entirely by
two justices attempting to apply a genuine but undefined standard,
now the decisions are swayed by only one justice, Justice Kennedy.
Furthermore, it is unclear how Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of
Justice Souter will alter the balance of power between the two
122
camps.
This is not simply an area where conservative and liberal justices
disagree over how to apply a standard of review. Rather, the two
groups are blatantly using entirely different standards of review. This
split analysis has gone undetected because the present standard is
undefined, and therefore the justices are in effect free to interpret
“reasonableness” in a manner that accords with their ideologies. Yet
the flexibility (which has resulted in the two camps’ applying different standards of review) is problematic for at least three reasons.
First, as written, the statute is arbitrary because it has hinged on the
opinions of two Justices, Kennedy and O’Connor, applying an undefined version of the standard. Second, because the Court has failed
to establish the contours of “objectively unreasonable” with any sort
of definitive test and has instead chosen to rely on its own inconsistent precedent, the statute fails to provide proper notice to petitioners as to the level of review to which courts will subject their alleged
federal law violations. Finally, the unpredictability of the standard of
review is dangerous in the capital context, where decisions determine
whether a death sentence is upheld and carried out. Therefore,
when looked at retrospectively, § 2254(d)(1) has proven to be fatally
flawed and in need of revision.
B. Blind Deference, De Novo, and Something In Between
The following two cases, selected from the empirical study
above, are illustrative of the “blind deference” and “de novo” analys123
es. Ramdass v. Angelone is a prototypical “blind deference” decision.
The majority affirmed a denial of the writ and held that the state
court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it failed to instruct
the jury that defendant Ramdass was parole ineligible at his death

121

See infra Part V.
In the two cases in which Justice Sotomayor has participated, she voted to grant
the writ in one case and deny the writ in the other. See supra Table 1.
123
530 U.S. 156 (2000). The decision was a five-to-four split, with Justice Kennedy
authoring the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas.
Id. at 159. Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence. Id. at 178 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens filed a dissent, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122
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124

sentencing. While Ramdass’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus
125
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Simmons, which held that
judges must inform juries when a defendant is parole ineligible un126
der state law at the time of the jury’s death penalty deliberations.
Ramdass argued that his case was indistinguishable from Simmons because a verdict in another matter involving Ramdass had made him
127
parole ineligible. The majority, however, reasoned that because the
“entry of judgment” had not yet been rendered in the other matter,
Ramdass had not “conclusively established” that he was in fact parole
128
ineligible, as required by Simmons.
By contrast, Justice Stevens’s dissent first noted “an acute unfairness in permitting a State to rely on a recent conviction to establish a
defendant’s future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting
the State to deny that there was such a conviction when the defendant attempts to argue that he is parole ineligible and therefore not a
129
future danger.”
Justice Stevens argued that the case was indistinguishable from, and “contrary to,” Simmons because even Simmons
was not “conclusively” parole ineligible at the time of his sentencing
as the parole board had not yet made its decision regarding Sim130
mons. Justice Stevens noted that even if the Court applied the correct law, “its application would be unreasonable” under the second
131
test. The dissent provided persuasive evidence as to why the state’s
distinction between convictions with an entry of judgment and those
132
with merely a guilty verdict is unreasonable. The majority ignored
the overwhelming evidence, noted by the dissent, that the case was
indistinguishable from Simmons and blindly deferred to the state.
This is a case where the conservative bloc’s utter refusal to find any
state decision unreasonable is obvious.
133
On the other side of the spectrum, Rompilla v. Beard provides a
prototypical “de novo” camp analysis. The Court reversed a denial of
124

Id. at 166.
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
126
Id. at 156.
127
Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 166.
128
Id. at 167.
129
Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130
Id. at 186.
131
Id. at 208.
132
Id. at 185–88.
133
545 U.S. 374 (2005). The decision was five-to-four, with Justice Souter writing
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Id. at 376. Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125
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the writ and held that the state court’s application of the Strickland
134
135
standard was objectively unreasonable.
After being sentenced to
death, Rompilla petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the district
136
court, claiming inadequate representation. The Court agreed with
the district court’s decision that the state court had unreasonably applied Strickland because Rompilla’s lawyers “had failed to investigate
‘pretty obvious signs’ that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and
suffered from mental illness and alcoholism, and instead had relied
unjustifiably on Rompilla’s own description of an unexceptional
137
background.”
The majority reasoned that Rompilla’s counsel
would have discovered this information if they examined the court
138
file on one of Rompilla’s prior convictions. Yet the Court conceded
that the lawyers did not ignore their obligation to find mitigating evidence and acknowledged that they did explore other avenues to ob139
tain such evidence.
The majority’s determination that the circuit
court was “objectively unreasonable” in holding that counsel was efficient did not apply the deference required by Strickland; the Court
rested its opinion on the alleged “incorrectness” of the circuit court
and not the “unreasonableness” of its decision.
The dissent argued that “under any standard of review the investigation performed by Rompilla’s counsel in preparation for sentenc140
ing was not only adequate but also conscientious.”
Particularly,
considering “the Court’s recognition that the duty to investigate does
not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up” and that “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a
line when they have good reason to think further investigation would
be a waste,” counsel’s performance could not be considered deficient
to such a degree that a state court’s judgment that it was sufficient
141
would be “objectively unreasonable.” Furthermore, the dissent gave
various compelling reasons for why the attorneys might not look to a
142
previous case file for mitigating evidence.
134

See supra note 44.
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 379.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 383–84.
139
Id. at 381.
140
Id. at 397.
141
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 404.
142
Id. at 401 (“The majority . . . disregards the sound strategic calculation supporting the decisions made by Rompilla’s attorneys. Charles and Dantos [Rompilla’s
counsel] were ‘aware of Rompilla’s priors’ and ‘aware of the circumstances’ surrounding these convictions. At the postconviction hearing, Dantos also indicated
135
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Rompilla is a perfect example of the “de novo” camp applying a
completely different standard than the “blind deference” camp. The
majority engaged in an independent analysis and decided that if defendant’s counsel looked though a prior case file, they would have
found information that they eventually would have chosen to include
as mitigating evidence. The Court transformed what was arguably a
wise tactic into an absolute requirement under Strickland, without any
“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent instructing it to do so.
Without such precedent, the Court’s finding—that the state court’s
decision to respect strategic decisions by counsel was “objectively unreasonable”—is difficult to understand. The Court’s analysis is even
more striking when one considers that the Strickland standard is al143
ready deferential to the judgment of counsel and that the review of
the state court’s application of that standard requires an “objectively
unreasonable” decision regarding that standard. As mentioned earlier, the Court apparently felt in its independent judgment that the
counsel’s performance was in fact insufficient and made its judgment
based on that belief. The Court gave little, if any, deference to the
state court’s application of this deferential law.
An example of a genuine but puzzling attempt to apply AEDPA
144
as written is Penry v. Johnson. The effort was genuine in that the majority reached different results on different claims within the same set
of facts. The decision was puzzling, however, because the Court refused to define the standard of “reasonableness” with respect to either claim. In Penry, petitioner Penry was convicted of rape and
145
murder, and sentenced to death. The majority considered his two
claims separately. In Part III.A, the Court affirmed the Texas Court
146
of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of Penry’s Fifth Amendment claim.
In Part III.B, the Court explained that Penry also contended that the
jury instructions given at his second sentencing hearing did not fol-

that she had reviewed the documents relating to the prior conviction. Based on this
information, as well as their numerous conversations with Rompilla and his family,
Charles and Dantos reasonably could conclude that reviewing the full prior conviction case file was not the best allocation of resources.”).
143
See supra note 44.
144
532 U.S. 782 (2001). Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court,
Parts I, II, and III.A of which were unanimous. III.B was joined by Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia joined.
145
Id. at 786.
146
Id. at 795 (“We therefore cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the
Texas court to conclude that Penry is not entitled to relief on his Fifth Amendment
claim.”).
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147

low Penry I because the instructions did not allow the jury to express
“its reasoned moral response to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s
148
mental retardation and childhood abuse.”
The Court found that,
under the instructions as given, “a reasonable juror could well have
believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry
did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating
149
evidence.” Thus, the state court’s decision that the jury instructions
provided at Penry’s second sentencing hearing satisfied Penry I was
150
Therefore, while “blind deference” jusobjectively unreasonable.
tices gave their usual flat out rejection of the writ, the majority engaged in a genuine attempt to apply the statute and came to different
results with regard to different claims within the same case.
V. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE COURT’S SPLIT ANALYSIS
With the background information in proper context, it is necessary to discern why the stark divide over the standard of review in §
2254(d)(1) is so problematic. The Court’s decisions since Williams
have raised three critical issues. First, because of the unrelenting
stubbornness of both camps, the fact that most decisions have been
five to four and that most decisions have hinged solely on Justices
Kennedy’s and O’Connor’s (undefined) analyses, the results are arbitrary. Second, the cases fail to treat similar situations similarly and
thus do not provide proper notice to potential petitioners of the degree of evidence required to succeed on habeas claims. Third, because cases in the capital punishment context are literally life or
death decisions, this is hardly the area of law to have ambiguity.
These issues are serious and demand a resolution.
A. Arbitrariness
As noted earlier, most of the relevant decisions applying §
2254(d)(1) in the capital punishment context are decided five to
four. Given that the “blind deference” and “de novo” camps are
fixed, the split decisions are strong evidence that the opinions have
almost entirely hinged on Justices Kennedy and O’Connor. Yet be-

147

Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 327–28 (1989) (“In order to ensure
‘reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,’ the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence
relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the
crime.”).
148
Penry, 532 U.S. at 796.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 797.
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cause even these two Justices have applied an undefined—albeit
more genuine—interpretation of the statute, the results have been
inconsistent. This point is best demonstrated by comparing some of
the five-to-four analyses that depended solely on Justice Kennedy’s or
Justice O’Connor’s addition to one of the predetermined groups.
These cases illustrate that in the absence of some explanation of what
standard the two Justices have been applying, we cannot be certain
that these cases were not decided merely at the whim of two individuals. The replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito—who
has fallen squarely into the “blind deference” camp in the seven deci151
sions in which he has taken part—has further magnified this point.
Thus, instead of the whim of two individuals, who could at least potentially balance against one another, future § 2254(d)(1) cases in
the capital context may rest solely on Justice Kennedy’s unspecified
analysis.
The arbitrariness of the provision is a simple but important issue. Because the two camps are fixed and neither Justice O’Connor’s
nor Justice Kennedy’s standards have any definite contours, the
Court’s decisions in this area have been, at the very best, unpredictable and, at worst random. As the following discussion will demonstrate, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have authored opinions of
both the “de novo” and “blind deference” camps at various times.
For example, in Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus and held that the state court’s decision—that the seventeen-year-old defendant was not “in custody” when he was brought
to the police station and questioned without counsel and without a
152
reading of his Miranda rights—was not objectively unreasonable. In
this decision, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion aligned with the
“blind deference” camp to sway the balance in its favor. Sounding
extremely deferential, Justice Kennedy stated that “fair-minded jurists
153
could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.” Justice Kennedy continued, reasoning that “[w]e cannot grant relief under
AEDPA by conducting our own independent inquiry into whether
154
the state court was correct as a de novo matter.” Therefore, in this
case, Justice Kennedy disclaimed the ability to conduct an “indepen-

151

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004). The decision was five to four with Justice Kennedy
writing the majority opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O’Connor, and
Thomas. Id. at 655. Justice Breyer filed the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 669 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153
Id. at 664 (majority opinion).
154
Id. at 665.
152
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dent inquiry” and contended that while the state court’s application
155
may have been wrong, it was not unreasonable.
Justice O’Connor has aligned with the “blind deference” camp
in many cases as well. Most notably, she authored the opinion joined
156
by the “blind deference” members in Lockyer v. Andrade.
In this
case, the majority found that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that
the state court’s decision—sentencing petitioner to two consecutive
terms of twenty-five years to life in prison for a “third strike” conviction—was an unreasonable application of the clearly established fed157
eral law. The Court stated that the precedents were unclear in this
area but ultimately concluded that “a gross disproportionality prin158
In Lockyer, the
ciple is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”
state court found petitioner guilty of violating California’s “three
159
strike” law.
On two occasions, petitioner stole videotapes totaling
about $150—which the prosecutor discretionarily charged as felonies
and not misdemeanors—and this triggered the law because he had a
160
prior misdemeanor. Hiding behind what she deemed an “unclear”
precedent, Justice O’Connor expressed reservations about overturning the state court’s judgment and ultimately concluded that the
grossly disproportionate principle only applied to “extraordinary”
161
cases.
But if fifty years to life in prison for stealing $150 of videotapes is not sufficiently “extraordinary,” then one has difficulty imaging a scenario that would be. In truth, Justice O’Connor was the
speaker for the “blind deference” camp in this opinion by refusing to
question a patently unjust state application of federal law.
In other cases, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor align with the
“de novo” camp, and their decisions fail to elaborate on the principles they used to justify such a radical shift. For example, Justice
Kennedy joined the “de novo” camp when he wrote the opinion in

155

Id.
538 U.S. 63 (2003). The decision was five to four, with Justice O’Connor authoring the majority, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id.
at 66. Justice Souter filed a dissent, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined. Id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting). As noted earlier, this case did not involve a
capital sentence; its reasoning, however, has proved to be influential in capital cases.
See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S.
133, 147 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661, 666 (2004); Mitchell v.
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003).
157
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77.
158
Id. at 72.
159
Id. at 67–68.
160
Id. at 67.
161
Id. at 77.
156
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Pannetti v. Quarterman, which reversed a denial of the writ of habeas
162
corpus. In Pannetti, the majority held that the state court’s application of federal law was objectively unreasonable when it determined
163
that petitioner was competent to be executed. The state courts and
court-appointed experts determined that petitioner was competent to
164
be executed.
Yet the Court disregarded these findings and, drawing conclusions of its own from the record that petitioner’s condition
165
was “worsening,” concluded that petitioner was not competent.
This reasoning directly conflicts with Yarborough, in which Kennedy
stated that the Court could not conduct its “own independent inquiry
166
into whether the state court was correct . . . .”
Similarly, Justice O’Connor has written opinions demonstrative
of the de novo camp. In Penry, she authored the majority opinion,
which was joined unanimously as to the part that denied the writ, but
only by the de novo camp (plus Justice Kennedy) as to the portion of
167
the opinion that granted the writ.
As noted earlier, this case allegedly involved a defective jury instruction, and the Court held that
the addition of a “supplemental instruction” was insufficient to meet
168
the standard of Penry I. Because of this, Justice O’Connor and the
“de novo” camp, found the state decision to be an “objectively unrea169
sonable” application of federal law.
Therefore, Justices Kennedy
and O’Connor demonstrated willingness to join either the “de novo”
or “blind deference” camps without any particular principle explain170
ing why they joined one camp or the other.
The particular issue is not that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
have aligned with one camp or another; the problem is that they do
so without definition or explanation or even an acknowledgment that
they are doing so. If they are measuring reasonableness by some test,

162
551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007). The decision was five to four. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined. Id. at 934. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito joined. Id. at 962 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
163
Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 937
166
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004)
167
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
168
See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text.
169
See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text.
170
The cases above were selected because Justices O’Connor and Kennedy actually wrote the opinions of the “blind deference” camp or the “de novo” camp. There
are many more decisions—in fact, most of the decisions—where their alliance with
one group or the other swayed the decision. See supra Table 1.
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they should transfer that test from the contours of their imagination
into the opinions that comprise the law. The Court’s decisions have
shown that an undefined standard of “reasonableness” has not sufficed to lead to the predictable results required by the law. Instead, it
has allowed wiggle room for “blind deference” and “de novo” Justices
to carve out their own standards. When the standards amount to polar-opposite analyses, the law is unworkable and in need of revision.
B. Notice
Section 2254(d)(1) is also troublesome because it does not treat
similar situations similarly. This is the zenith of injustice, and the
concern is only magnified by the life or death consequences present
in the capital punishment context. In situations where de novo review applies, the petitioner obviously has a much better chance of
having the writ granted and hence living. By contrast, where “blind
deference” applies, the petitioner is virtually assured of being denied
the writ and hence executed. The inconsistencies within the Court
regarding the standard of “objective reasonableness” fail to provide
the proper notice to petitioners as to the level of “incorrectness” required for a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
This point is evident when comparing the similar facts in Rompil171
172
la and Schriro v. Landrigan that led to opposite results. As noted
earlier, Rompilla held that the state court’s decision that defendant’s
173
counsel were not ineffective was “objectively unreasonable.”
The
Court’s Rompilla decision was the prototype “de novo” case, where the
Court reasoned that defendant’s counsels were “unreasonable” because they did not research the case file on one of defendant’s prior
crimes that would have led to mitigating evidence that might have
avoided a death sentence, even though substantial evidence indicated
174
that counsel did make an investigation into other sources. By contrast, only two years after the Rompilla decision the Schriro Court reversed a grant of the writ and held that counsel was not ineffective
175
under the Strickland standard when he failed to investigate further
171

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). See supra notes 133–43143 and accompanying text.
172
550 U.S. 465 (2007). The decision was five to four, with Justice Thomas delivering the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito. Id. at 468. Justice Stevens filed a dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388; see also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
174
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383–84; see also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying
text.
175
See supra note 44.
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sources of mitigating evidence at defendant’s request.
In Schriro,
counsel interviewed defendant’s relatives but did not search into oth177
er sources that would have evidenced his troubled background.
The majority reasoned that “at the time of the Arizona postconviction
court’s decision, it was not objectively unreasonable for that court to
conclude that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of
any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based
on his counsel’s failure to investigate further possible mitigating evi178
dence.”
These decisions are irreconcilable. If the same standard had
been applied the results would have been the same; indeed, with respect to the result, every Justice ruled the same in Schriro as he or she
did in Rompilla. The only difference between these cases is that Justice Alito had replaced Justice O’Connor upon her retirement, and
his addition to the Court swayed the analysis in favor of the “blind deference” camp in Schriro, which came later. When defendants cannot
be sure which standard, “blind deference” or “de novo,” will be applied to essentially identical facts, the law fails to provide proper notice to petitioners. The Court’s decision on these issues—life-ordeath issues—should not be dictated by which ideological camp the
Justices choose. Instead, these decisions should be dictated by the
law, with all of the justices applying the same standard, even if they
disagree as to how the facts apply to the agreed-upon standard.
C. Life-or-Death Results
The Court has often stressed the necessity of ensuring correct
results in the capital punishment context. For instance, in Dobbs v.
179
Zant, the Court noted that it had “emphasized before the impor180
tance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record.” Agreeing with this notion, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle
stated that “time and again the Court has condemned procedures in
capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary
176

Schriro, 550 U.S. at 472.
Id. at 469, 471.
178
Id. at 478.
179
506 U.S. 357 (1993).
180
Id. at 358. Petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
alleged that his counsel was ineffective. Id. at 358. The State represented that a copy
of the transcript of the closing arguments at the sentencing phase was unavailable
and relied solely on the counsel’s testimony. Id. Petitioner subsequently located the
transcript which directly contradicted the counsel’s testimony. Id. The Supreme
Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred in its conclusion that the record could not
be reconsidered. Id.
177
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181

case.”
ilar:

The Court in Woodson v. North Carolina urged something sim-

[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
182
specific case.

As the Court has rightly recognized, the consequences of decisions in
this context are indeed severe. Of relevance to this Comment, when
the Court affirms a denial of the writ or reverses a grant of the writ, it
is essentially permitting the previous execution sentence to proceed.
Therefore, these decisions ultimately can lead to the death of human
beings.
The Court’s recognition of capital punishment’s finality renders
the uncertainty of the § 2254(d)(1) “reasonableness” test for habeas
review troubling. After thirteen years of courts applying a standard
that has received steady criticism for its ambiguity and inconsistency,
neither Congress nor the Court has attempted to establish clearer
guidelines for the habeas review of federal law claims under §
2254(d)(1). Ultimately, Congress has the most power to change the
law in this respect by amending the Act. Even so, the Court—
whether or not it would like to admit it—also has the power to modify
the standard to reach a clearer and fairer results. In Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, Justice O’Connor established considerations for the Court
183
to weigh when deciding whether to overrule one of its precedents —
which in this case would be Williams. She noted that in evaluating an
existing law, “we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolera184
ble simply in defying practical workability.” Analyzing the results of
the Williams interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) and its split standard demonstrates that this law, in its undefined present state, is unworkable
and in need of alteration.

181

463 U.S. 880, 913 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority held that evidence presented by two psychiatrists regarding petitioner’s future dangerousness,
which ultimately contributed to the petitioner’s death sentence, was not barred by
the Constitution. Id. at 896 (majority opinion). The psychiatrists had never evaluated petitioner personally. Id. at 917. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). The Court invalidated a North Carolina statute that
imposed a mandatory death sentence and held that a court must be allowed to consider the character and record of the defendant in its decision. Id.
183
505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
184
Id.
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Brown v. Payton demonstrates the precise problem of allowing
185
incorrect applications of federal law to stand in AEDPA cases.
In
Brown, the Court reversed a grant of the writ of habeas corpus and
held that the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law when
it concluded that a jury instruction did not have to take count of de186
fendant’s post-crime religious conversion.
With regard to jury in187
structions, the judge directed—in accordance with factor (k) —that
jurors consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity
188
of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” Defense counsel requested that the court alter the instruction to make
explicit the jury’s obligation to evaluate the evidence of the defen189
dant’s character, including his religious conversion. The state court
190
refused to alter the instruction.
The Court did not think that the
California Supreme Court’s determination—that factor (k) was sufficiently broad to encompass petitioner’s concerns—was unreasona191
ble. The majority ruled that, “[e]ven on the assumption that [the
California Supreme Court’s] conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA
192
shields on habeas review.”
The Brown analysis provides another clear example of the problem with the current application of § 2254(d)(1) in a capital context.
The majority hides behind the cloak of its “wrong-but-reasonable”
analysis, which Congress explicitly rejected as a possible interpreta193
tion of the provision, and signals its approval of the execution of a
man that concededly might have been convicted in violation of his
constitutional rights. As Justice Breyer noted in concurrence, “[T]his
185

544 U.S. 133 (2005). The decision was five to three, with Justice Kennedy authoring the majority opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 135. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, joined by Thomas. Id. at
147 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 148
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Stevens
and Ginsburg. Id. at 149 (Souter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
take part in the decision. Id. at 147.
186
Id. at 143 (majority opinion).
187
“Factor (k) was a catchall instruction, in contrast to the greater specificity of
the instructions that preceded it. As set forth in the statute, and as explained to the
jury, it directed jurors to consider ‘[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.’” Id. at 137.
188
Id. at 164.
189
Id. at 137.
190
Id. at 153.
191
Brown, 544 U.S. at 142.
192
Id. at 143.
193
See supra Part II.B.
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is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable
conclusions of state-court judges makes a critical difference. Were I a
California state judge, I would likely hold that Payton’s penalty-phase
194
proceedings violated the 8th Amendment.” As a five-to-three decision, if Justice Breyer had been able to rule that the application of
federal law was incorrect, as he admitted it was, the result would have
195
been different.
Because his hands were tied by the procedural
thicket of AEDPA and Williams, Breyer was in effect “forced” to deny
the writ, which ended up resulting in an affirmed death sentence of
petitioner. The U.S. Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal
law, not the state courts. If the Court finds a mistake regarding federal law, as there was in this case, the Court’s job to remedy that error.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A complete analysis of § 2254(d)(1) requires an evaluation of
potential solutions to the problems created by the Court’s split interpretation. There are primarily two potential solutions to the issues
posed by the current standard. First, the Court could identify criteria
by which to evaluate the “reasonableness” of the state court’s application of federal law. When one group of Justices says that the state
court is almost never “unreasonable” and another says that the state
court is “unreasonable” up to 63 % of the time, the standard is anything but “objective.” Other areas of the law have demonstrated that
defining “reasonableness” is possible. For instance, in tort law judges
frequently evaluate reasonableness by using the “Hand Formula.”
Under this equation, an individual is negligent when the burden of
adequate care is less than the combination of the probability of the
196
harm and gravity of the harm. Yet the Hand formula evaluates the
reasonableness of conduct, which is conceptually easier to understand than the reasonableness of a court’s application of law.
In the current context, “reasonableness” is not so easily definable. The line between incorrect and unreasonable state court decisions is especially elusive. Perhaps the Court could apply a test similar to the one used to evaluate “plain error” in criminal and civil jury

194

Brown, 544 U.S. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Since the Eighth Circuit granted the writ, if Justice Breyer voted to affirm this
decision the Court would have been split four to four. As such, the default rule is to
revert to the circuit court’s decision, which granted petitioner the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478, 478 (1985) (“The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”).
196
United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947).
195
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instructions. Johnson v. United States identified four factors for courts
to consider in determining whether plain-error review is appropriate:
[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) an “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that
“affects substantial rights.” If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited
error, but only if (4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, inte197
grity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Using a test similar to this, the Court would first evaluate whether an
error exists at all in the state court’s application of federal law. If an
error exists, the Court would then determine whether the error is sufficiently obvious. Because the cases involve constitutional protections
that determine whether petitioners are sentenced to death, the third
factor, related to the effect on substantial rights, will always be met in
the capital context. Finally, an error in cases of this magnitude would
surely affect the “fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” This test, however, creates more questions than answers. The most critical issue would be how to evaluate whether an
error is “plain.” This just seems to be another way of asking if the error was “unreasonable,” which is precisely the question the test would
be set out to answer. In sum, this test would not be very helpful, and
it is difficult to conceive of other tests that would be.
As a second possibility, the standard could be overruled entirely—in light of the results it has produced—resulting in a reversion
back to a de novo standard. This de-novo standard would apply only
to capital cases because of the magnitude of the penalty. State-court
factual determinations would still be treated with deference. After
all, state courts are in the best position to evaluate the facts because
they hear testimony and have juries to evaluate credibility. With regard to application of federal law, however, the federal courts, and
the Supreme Court in particular, are in the best position to evaluate
accuracy. The balancing of harms—between, on the one hand, respecting state courts and preventing abuse of the habeas process, and,
on the other hand, reaching accurate results when the penalty is
death on the other—clearly favors de novo review. In addition, because half of the Supreme Court is already effectually applying de novo review anyway, the alteration would encourage consistency.
Further, the repeal of § 2254(d)(1) in the capital-punishment
context is a logical solution because the original justifications for the

197

520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997).
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198

restrictive standard have been undermined. First, the notion that
courts need to guard against an influx of habeas petitions is un199
founded.
While “the number of habeas petitions has increased,”
200
the percentage of prisoners filing habeas petitions has not. In addition, the notion that prisoners facing capital sentences are particularly likely to use the habeas system to delay their punishment has been
refuted. If this were the case, the percentage of habeas petitions filed
201
would be lower in states that have abolished the death penalty. Yet
“five of the fourteen non-death penalty states, or thirty-five percent,
202
had rates of habeas filings above the national average.” Thus, petitioners have not especially abused the habeas system in the capitalpunishment context. Accordingly, repealing AEDPA would be fair
and likely would not negatively impact judicial efficiency or promote
abuse of the habeas system.
Furthermore, overruling AEDPA and instead instituting de-novo
review would allow the Court to perform its constitutional obligation
to pronounce the law. In her article, Saying What the Law Is, District
Judge Lynn Adelman identified the problems with the current “unreasonableness” standard:
[I]n order to grant habeas relief under AEDPA, the federal court
must find the state court decision under consideration not only
wrong, but unsupportable. The standard thus requires prisoners
who have been convicted in violation of the Constitution to remain in prison. In addition, it does not require federal courts to
determine whether state court decisions are correct or incorrect,
203
or even to say what the law is.

As Judge Adelman went on to explain, if “courts refrain from criticizing decisions hostile to constitutional rights, the result will be a decline in the level of our constitutional protections (as well as fewer
conflicts for the Supreme Court to resolve, should the Court choose
204
to resolve them).”
In Judge Adelman’s identification of the problem, the solution becomes apparent. If the Court is able to evaluate
federal legal claims de novo, it can overturn state decisions that apply
198
David Blumberg, Habeas Leaps From the Pan and Into the Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and
the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L. REV. 557, 577 (1997).
199
Id. at 577–79.
200
Id. at 578.
201
Id. at 579.
202
Id.
203
Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede the Development of Constitutional Law and What Courts Can Do About It, 2007
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007).
204
Id. at 6.
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federal law incorrectly. This will ensure that constitutional protections remain intact and that the Court maintains its role as the arbiter
of federal law. Furthermore, allowing federal judges to “say what the
law is” will enable courts to establish a law that provides proper notice
and is not arbitrary. These characteristics are especially crucial in the
capital punishment context.
VII. CONCLUSION
The objective data since Williams v. Taylor demonstrate a split
standard when it comes to federal habeas review of claims adjudicated on the merits at the state level. Furthermore, even aside from
the issues addressed in this Comment, federal judges have noted that
AEDPA is generally flawed. For example, a recent New York Times article noted the disdain that many of these judges have for AEDPA’s
205
stringent provisions. The article explained that “in dozens of capital cases in recent years, appeals court judges, some of whom have
ruled in favor of the death penalty many times, have complained that
Congress and the Supreme Court have raised daunting barriers for
206
death row prisoners to appeal their convictions.” Further evidence
of the displeasure of federal judges is demonstrated by the fact that
“[s]ince its passage, the act has been cited in a half-dozen to two doz207
en dissents a year.”
With respect to § 2254(d)(1), the “objective unreasonableness”
standard was a drastic departure from the preexisting habeas law.
Prior to the adoption of AEDPA, federal courts applied de-novo review to state courts’ application of federal law. Then, in the wake of
the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed AEDPA to reduce delays in the habeas system and ensure respect for state-court sentences.
Yet even when Congress debated AEDPA, both critics and supporters
expressed reservations about the possibility of a “wrong-butreasonable” interpretation, which would allow incorrect state-court
interpretations to stand as long as they were reasonable. These fears
were eventually realized in future Supreme Court cases that were the
focus of this Comment.
In the wake of AEDPA, federal courts disagreed over how to apply the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language of the
statute. Eventually, Williams v. Taylor provided that the language es-

205
John Schwartz, Fervent Dissents on Behalf of Death Row Inmates Are Increasing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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tablished two different tests. While the “contrary to” prong has been
largely uncontroversial, the “unreasonable application” test has been
extremely troublesome. As the years passed, the Williams Court explicitly adopted the “wrong-but-reasonable” approach, against which
Congress fought prior to AEDPA’s adoption. While appearing to be
a unified “reasonableness” standard, not unlike in other areas of law,
the standard with respect to § 2254(d)(1) proved to be elusive as applied in the cases following Williams.
Since Williams, the Court has split into two blocs and applied two
entirely different standards of “reasonableness” depending on the
members of the Court who represent the majority. The “blind deference” camp has read “unreasonable application” to mean that federal courts must simply defer to the state-court’s application of federal law. This is evidenced by the fact that this group of justices has
found the state-court application of federal law to be unreasonable in
only 4–14% of the cases since Williams. On the other hand, the “de
novo” camp has engaged in analysis even more stringent than that
expected of traditional de novo review. Since 2000, this group of justices has found the state-court’s application of federal law “objectively
unreasonable” most of the time. This evidence indicates not merely a
disagreement over how to apply the standard, but the use of two different standards.
Somewhere in the middle and vacillating between the two blocs,
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have been the crucial swing votes in
this area. While their numbers have aligned with the expectations of
the statute, the exact contours of the standards they have applied are
unclear. Specifically, they failed to set forth the principles they used
to justify aligning with the “blind deference” bloc in some cases and
the “de novo” reasoning in others. Yet the real problem with the analyses of the two justices is that their standard—while admittedly more
honest—remains undefined. Further, with Justice O’Connor’s replacement by Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy is the sole justice standing
between the two camps. This may make future § 2254(d)(1) cases
even more unpredictable than they have been since Williams.
When studied retrospectively, the data suggests three major issues with the Court’s cases since Williams. First, the cases have proven
that the standard, as it exists, is arbitrary. Many cases are decided five
to four, and the results often hinge on which camp Justices Kennedy
or O’Connor aligned with on a particular day—with no reasoning or
indication of how they might align prior to the decision due to their
undefined standard. Second, the cases have failed to provide notice
to potential petitioners as to the degree of incorrectness that the state
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court must have exhibited with regard to their constitutional rights.
Because Justices O’Connor and Kennedy both wrote opinions expressing “blind deference” and “de novo” sentiments and because
their opinions swayed the Court, the results have been, at best, unpredictable, and, at worst, random. Finally, this area is particularly
sensitive because of the Court’s traditional recognition of capital punishment as an area where accuracy is of utmost priority.
These results indicate that AEDPA and its standard of “reasonableness” have failed. While lawmakers could try to come up with a
way to define “reasonableness” in a way that provides more predictability, the most logical solution is to change the standard for death
penalty cases back to the de novo review that existed before AEDPA’s
enactment. This would allow the Court to correct concededly incorrect interpretations of federal law and would further provide the
Court with the flexibility to perform its constitutional function of defining the law. The de-novo standard is particularly meritorious because the original justifications for abolishing it have proven unwarranted. Because history has demonstrated that the standard of
“objective unreasonableness” is unworkable, lawmakers should reinstitute the de novo standard of review for state court applications of
federal law.

